Attorney–Client Privilege in Bad Faith Insurance Claims:
The Cedell Presumption and a Necessary National
Resolution
Klien Hilliard*
ABSTRACT
Attorney–client privilege is one of the most important aspects of our
legal system. It is one of the oldest privileges in American law and is
codified both at the national and state level. Applying to both individual
persons and corporations, this expanded privilege covers a wide breadth
of clients. However, this broad privilege can sometimes become blurred
in relationships between the corporation and the individuals it serves.
Specifically, insurance companies and those they cover have complex
relationships, as the insurer possesses a quasi-fiduciary relationship in
relation to the insured. This type of relationship requires that the insurer
act in good faith towards its insured, giving equal weight to its own
interests as well as the insured’s. When attorneys become involved in the
claim-handling process—usually advising insurers about whether to
accept or deny a claim—it is often difficult to determine whether the
attorney is acting in an investigative capacity, thus merely a factual one,
or in contemplation of litigation, thus a privileged and protected one. The
separation of these duties is an important determination to make,
especially in the event of a bad faith action. When an insured makes a bad
faith claim against their insurer, presumably for fraudulently denying their
claim, the insured would naturally be entitled to its claim file—the only
documentation of its own claim assessment—right? Unfortunately, no
uniform answer to that question exists in federal or state law. The insurer
will likely claim attorney–client privilege to protect those documents, and
the insured will likely seek to either pierce that privilege or to altogether
abrogate it. And, to complicate matters further, different jurisdictions
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apply different standards and privilege exceptions in these difficult
situations. Due to the fact that a large number of insurance companies are
national entities that conduct business across various states, a uniform
standard for addressing attorney–client privilege in insurance bad faith
actions is paramount. Washington courts have imposed a presumption of
no attorney–client privilege in insurance bad faith actions, recognizing the
necessity of broad discovery and highlighting the importance of good faith
in the often-unequal relationship between an insurer and its insured. It is
this presumption that is recommended be nationally recognized by
codifying it in either the federal rules, a national act, or adding an
exception to the model rules of professional conduct, in order to promote
discovery of vital case information and limit unfair practices.
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INTRODUCTION
Attorney–client privilege has a long standing and important role in
the legal system. It is the oldest privilege protecting confidential
communications in common law,1 and has been codified both in the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct2 and statutes in every state.3 Its purpose is
“to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their
clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of
law and administration of justice.”4 A lawyer’s ability to be fully informed
by the client of the facts and issues of a matter is paramount to providing
sound legal advice and advocacy.5 The hallmark of the attorney–client
relationship is trust.6 The client must be able to “communicate fully and
frankly with the lawyer even as to embarrassing or legally damaging
subject matter”; the lawyer requires this information to effectively

1. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)); see also Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1070
(1978) (“[R]eported decisions involving the privilege begin in 1654.”).
2. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
3. See Ala. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2015); Alaska Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2017);
Ariz. Rules of Prof’l Conduct ER 1.6 (2015); Ark. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2014); Cal. Rules
of Prof’l Conduct r. 3-100 (2018); Colo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2016); Conn. Rules of Prof’l
Conduct r. 1.6 (2014); Del. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2013); D.C. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6
(2007): Fla. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 4-1.6 (2015); Ga. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 4-201 (2018);
Haw. Ex. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2014); Idaho Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2004); Ill. Rules
of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2016); Ind. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2005); Iowa Rules of Prof’l
Conduct r. 32:1.6 (2005); Kan. 226 Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2014); Ky. Rules of Prof’l Conduct
r. 3.130 (2009); La. Bar art. 16 Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2015); Me. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r.
1.6 (2015); Md. Att’y r. 19-301.6 (2016); Mass. S. Ct. r. 3:07 Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2015);
Mich. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2019); Minn. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2019); Miss. Rules
of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2015); Mo. Bar r. 4-1.6 (2005); Mont. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2017);
Neb. E R. Prof’l Conduct § 3-501.6 (2017); Nev. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2014); N.H. Rules of
Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2016); N.J. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2018); N.M. Rules of Prof’l Conduct
r. 16-106 (2013); N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2019); N.C. Bar Ch. 2, r. 1.6 (2017); N.D. Rules
of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2016); Ohio Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2013); Okla. Rules of Prof’l
Conduct r. 1.6 (2016); Or. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2003); Pa. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6
(2018); R.I. S. Ct. Art. V Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2007); S.C. A. Ct. r. 407 Rules of Prof’l
Conduct r. 1.6 (2014); S.D. Rules of Prof’l Conduct App. Ch. 16-18 r. 1.6 (2018); Tenn. S. Ct. r. 8,
Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2017); Tex. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.05 (1991); Utah Rules of
Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2017); Vt. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2009); Va. S. Ct. Pt. 6 § 2 Rules of
Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2016); Wash. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 1.6 (2018); W. Va. Rules of Prof’l
Conduct r. 1.6 (2015); Wis. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r. 20:1.6 (2017); Wyo. Rules of Prof’l Conduct r.
1.6 (2014).
4. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
5. See id.
6. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6, cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (explaining that
with this trust the client is encouraged to “communicate fully and frankly with the lawyer” even in
regard to potentially damaging topics, in which the lawyer needs to effectively represent and advise
the client).
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represent and advise the client.7 This privilege most importantly “prohibits
disclosure of confidential communications.”8 Not only is this privilege
significant within the legal system, it is also widely recognized and
referenced in social aspects of society.9
The attorney–client privilege generally applies when four elements10
are present. First, the holder asserting the privilege is seeking or has sought
to be a client. Second, the person to which the communication was made
is a member of the jurisdiction’s respective bar, and the communication is
made pursuant to that person’s role as an attorney. Third, the
communication is related to facts the client confidentially communicated
to the attorney (i.e., not in the presence of third parties), and for the purpose
of securing legal services, an opinion of law, or assistance in a legal
proceeding. And fourth, the privilege is claimed and is not waived11 by the
client.12 If these four elements are met, the privilege will generally apply.

7. Id.
8. MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, 3 SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 7.05 (5th ed.
Supp. 2018).
9. To illustrate how famous this rule is in America’s culture and understanding of the legal
system, see the following discussions on how this privilege is conveyed in today’s current news and
popular culture and how it is often criticized in its depiction in popular television shows: Jessica
Levinson, How Don Jr.’s Ridiculous Claim About Attorney-Client Privilege Could Actually Work,
NBC NEWS (Dec. 15, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/don-jr-s-ridiculous-claimabout-attorney-client-privilege-could-ncna829986 [https://perma.cc/84XE-7VZS]; Kyle Swenson,
Sean Hannity’s Idea of ‘Attorney-Client Privilege’ Was Right out of ‘Breaking Bad,’ WASH. POST
(Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2018/04/17/sean-hannitysidea-of-attorney-client-privilege-is-right-out-of-breaking-bad-its-alsowrong/?utm_term=.e5e4214538b6 [https://perma.cc/SEX2-UX9T]; Anna Codrea-Rado, What Real
Lawyers Think About Breaking Bad–and Why It Should Be Taught in Class, THE GUARDIAN (May 22,
2015), https://www.theguardian.com/tv-and-radio/2015/may/22/what-real-lawyers-think-aboutbreaking-bad [https://perma.cc/QDT4-VPVV]; Nicole Bitette, Attorney-Client Privilege Isn’t All That
Saul Goodman Made It Out to Be, DAILY NEWS (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.nydailynews.
com/entertainment/tv/don-saul-goodman-advice-attorney-client-privilege-article-1.3926005
[https://perma.cc/UF4T-RAYD]; Harry Graff, Standard of Review: On ‘Suits,’ Attorney-Client
Privilege No Longer Exists, ABOVE THE LAW (Sept. 22, 2016), https://abovethelaw.com
/2016/09/standard-of-review-on-suits-attorney-client-privilege-no-longer-exists/?rf=1 [https://perma.
cc/DQZ3-UQAW].
10. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358–59 (D. Mass. 1950).
11. Attorney–client privilege may be either express or implied; even if a client did not intend to
waive his or her attorney–client privilege, “the client’s failure to take reasonable precautions to
preserve the confidentiality of attorney–client communications can result in the destruction of [the
client’s] privilege protection.” PAUL R. RICE, ATTORNEY–CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 9.22 (2017). See generally FED. R. EVID. 502. For more information on implied waiver and
jurisdictional tests regarding the required conditions to be met to impliedly waive privilege, see Steven
Plitt & Joshua D. Rogers, The Battle to Define the Scope of Attorney–Client Privilege in the Context
of Insurance Company Bad Faith: A Judicial War Zone, 14 U.N.H. L. REV. 105, 110–14 (2016).
12. Id.
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The attorney–client privilege extends not only to natural persons but
also to corporate clients.13 In Upjohn Co. v. United States, the U.S.
Supreme Court rejected the “control group” test, which limited the claim
of privilege to officers and agents who were responsible for the company’s
actions and extended that privilege to all employees.14 Thus, this expanded
privilege applies to cover all individuals who have pertinent information
needed by the attorney to properly advise and represent the corporate
client. This Comment will focus on insurance companies as corporate
clients who invoke the attorney–client privilege. Generally, no insuredinsurer specific privilege exists to protect communications between an
insured and its liability or indemnity insurer. Instead, the privilege
commonly invoked to protect such communications is the ever-important
attorney–client privilege.
Insurance claims, specifically, raise interesting and important
questions regarding attorney–client privilege, considering the relationship
between the insurer and the insured. In insurance actions, the insurer has
a “quasi-fiduciary” relationship with the insured.15 This quasi-fiduciary
relationship requires the insurer to act in good faith towards its insured and
“imposes on the insurer ‘a broad obligation of fair dealing . . . and a
responsibility to give equal consideration to the insured’s interests.’”16
Due to this relationship, when an attorney investigates the surrounding
facts of a claim, “he or she owes a quasi-fiduciary duty to the insured.”17
It is often difficult to determine whether the attorney was acting in an
investigative capacity in relation to a claim or working in order to provide
legal advice to the insurer in contemplation of litigation.
In the investigative and adjustive capacity, the insurer–attorney is
performing duties viewed as in furtherance of an ordinary business
function and, thus, conducts a factual investigation.18 However, when an
attorney for the insurance company works to obtain coverage for a claim
or in preparation for an anticipated lawsuit, the attorney is within the role
13. See David Simon, The Attorney–Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J.
953, 953–54 (1956).
14. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981).
15. A “true fiduciary” relationship would place the insured’s interests above the insurers. Thus,
“something less than a fiduciary relationship exists between the insurer and the insured. Safeco Ins.
Co. of Am. v. Butler, 823 P.2d 499, 504 (1992) (citing Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 715 P.2d
1133 (Wash. 1986)).
16. Ian S. Birk, The Cedell Presumption: Discovery of the Insurer’s Claim File in Insurance Bad
Faith Litigation in Washington, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 503, 513 (2014) (quoting Tank v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 715 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Wash. 1986)).
17. Dan D. Kohane, Sean Griffin & John R. Ewell, Invading the Sanctuary Practical Solutions
to Fend Off the Attack on the Confidentiality of Insurer-Coverage Counsel Communications, 11 No.
2 IN-HOUSE DEF. Q. 42 (2016).
18. Susan Page White, Attitude Adjustment Case Law Makes It Clear That the Attorney-Client
Privilege Does Not Attach When an Attorney Acts as A Claims Adjuster, L.A. LAW. 18–20 (2010).
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of legal counsel, representing the insurance company.19 The separation of
these duties is paramount in determining whether any privilege applies in
respect to those communications and claim files, especially because the
privilege applies solely to the communications between the attorney and
the client, and not the actual facts of the matter.20
This Comment examines the relationship between the insurer and the
insured in bad faith insurance claims regarding waiver of the critical
attorney–client privilege and suggests a national framework for handling
such waivers. Specifically, this Comment draws from the presumption
standard used by Washington state—adopted in Cedell v. Farmers
Insurance Co. of Washington—to develop a recommendation for a
national standard amongst the ever-evolving jurisdictional differences.21
Part I of this Comment discusses the background and ultimate
application of the Cedell presumption in Washington state. Part II then
examines Washington’s application of the Cedell presumption in relation
to relevant privilege statutes, and how Washington courts have applied the
presumption since its inception. Part III of this Comment examines states
that have applied similar exceptions, and Part IV compares those
states with similar exceptions to states refusing to apply any privilege
exceptions or very limited ones. Finally, Part V will offer a potential
national presumption modeled after Cedell to incorporate within the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct in order to bring unity across states
in this national issue.
I. BACKGROUND
Attorney–client privilege in the insurance context most often arises
in connection with bad faith insurance claims. The Model Unfair Claims
Settlement Practices Act (UCSPA),22—drafted by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)—which has been
adopted in almost every state,23 identifies what constitutes fair and unfair

19. Id.
20. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981).
21. Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 295 P.3d 239 (Wash. 2013).
22. Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act (Nat’l Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs 1997).
23. Id. at ST-900-3–ST-300-6. States and territories that have adopted the most recent UCSPA
in a substantially similar model include: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Manie, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Northern
Marianas, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
States and territories currently without activity or adoption include: District of Columbia, Guam, Iowa,
Mississippi, Nevada, and Virgin Islands.
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coverage of claim practices.24 Under UCSPA, examples of unfair practices
include “‘refusing to pay claims without conducting a reasonable
investigation’ and ‘not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair
and equitable settlement of claims submitted in which liability has become
reasonably clear.’”25 Courts view bad faith claims as originating in tort,
applying the same principles as used in other tort actions in which the
insured must show that an alleged breach of an insurance policy was
unreasonable.26 For example, Washington’s Insurance Fair Conduct Act27
(IFCA) allows a first-party claimant who alleges an insurer unreasonably
denied coverage of its claim to bring an action in court to recover damages
actually sustained and attorney’s fees.28
A. Claimant Status
In bad faith insurance claims, courts treat claimants that are first
parties, third parties, and underinsured or uninsured motorists (UIM)
differently.29 A first-party claimant is generally an “individual,
corporation, association, partnership, or other legal entity asserting a right
to payment as a covered person under an insurance policy” or contract that
arises out of a loss covered by the intended policy.30 A first-party claim
weighs heavily on the quasi-fiduciary relationship between the insurer and
the insured because the insurer is required to act in good faith and must

24. UNITED POLICYHOLDERS, ADVOCACY & ACTION PROGRAM, 50 STATE SURVEY OF BAD
FAITH LAWS AND REMEDIES (Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.uphelp.org/sites/default/files/publications/
Final%20-%20Bad%20Faith%20Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YLK-QULL].
25. Id.
26. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Onvia, Inc., 196 P.3d 664 (Wash. 2008); see also WASH.
REV. CODE § 48.01.030 (2018).
27. See WASH. REV. CODE § 48.30.015 (2007).
28. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.30.015(1) (2007).
29. Although not largely discussed in this Comment, a UIM in Washington state means a motor
vehicle which, at the time the accident occurs, has no applicable insurance policy covering it, or the
sum of the limits of liability under an insurance policy is less than the damages the covered person is
entitled to recover. See WASH. REV. CODE § 48.22.030 (1) (2015). In Cedell, the court stated that there
is a difference between UIM claims and first party claims: “[I]n the UIM context, the UIM insurer
steps into the shoes of the tortfeasor and may defend as the tortfeasor would defend . . . the insurance
company is entitled to counsel’s advice in strategizing the same defenses that the tortfeasor could have
asserted. Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 295 P.3d 239, 245 (Wash. 2013). In the context of a
UIM case, “parties contract directly with UIM insurers to provide an additional layer of compensation
where the at-fault party has insufficient coverage . . . provid[ing] a second later of excess insurance
coverage that ‘floats’ on top of the recovery from other sources for the injured party.” Hoff v. Safeco
Ins. Co. of Ill., 449 P.3d 667, 674 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019), review denied, 458 P.3d 790 (2020) (citing
Fisher v. Allstate Ins. Co., 961 P.2d 350 (1998)). See Escalante v. Sentry Ins., 743 P.2d 832, 842–43
(Wash. Ct. App. 1987) for a case analysis of attorney–client privilege in UIM cases, or Hoff, 449 P.3d
667 for a more recent analysis.
30. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.30.015(4).
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deal fairly with the insured, giving the claimant equal consideration
between the insured’s interests and its own.31
A third-party claimant is any claimant “or other legal entity asserting
a claim against any individual, corporation, association, partnership or
other legal entity insured under an insurance policy or insurance contract
of the insurer.”32 Unlike a first-party claimant, in most states, including
Washington, a third-party claimant cannot bring an action against the
insurer of an insured.33
The differences between first- and third-party claims—or
claimants—are important regarding the extent of the applicable attorney–
client privilege. Jurisdictional differences can impact whether the claiming
party may directly bring a suit against a defendant’s insurer.34 For the
purposes of the insured–insurer relationship and applicable claims, this
Comment will focus on first-party bad faith claims and the requisite
privileges afforded therein.
B. Pre-Cedell Presumption
In Tank v. State Farm & Casualty Co., the Washington Supreme
Court held that, because a quasi-fiduciary relationship exists between an
insurer and the insured, an insurer “has an enhanced obligation to its
insured as part of its duty of good faith.”35 In order to fulfill this enhanced
obligation, the insurance company must meet four criteria:
First, the [insurance] company must thoroughly investigate the cause
of the insured’s accident and the nature and severity of the plaintiff’s
injuries. Second, it must retain competent defense counsel for the
insured. Both retained defense counsel and the insurer must
understand that only the insured is the client. Third, the company has
the responsibility for fully informing the insured not only of the
reservation of rights defense itself but of all developments relevant to
his policy coverage and the progress of his lawsuit. Information
regarding progress of the lawsuit includes disclosure of all settlement
31. See Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 295 P.3d 239 (Wash. 2013); Van Noy v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 983 P.2d 1129, 1132 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
32. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-30-320(14) (2007).
33. Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 715 P.2d 1133, 1140 (Wash. 1986); see Ian S. Birk, The
Cedell Presumption: Discovery of the Insurer’s Claim File in Insurance Bad Faith Litigation in
Washington, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 503 (2014).
34. For example, the claimant’s status as first-party, third-party, or UIM can affect to what extent
the insured deals directly with the insurer regarding the claim file.
35. Tank, 715 P.2d at 1136. As noted in the Introduction, a quasi-fiduciary relationship requires
the insurer to act in good faith towards its insured and imposes an obligation of fair dealing and
responsibility to give equal consideration to not only the insurer’s interests but also to the insured’s
interest. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Butler, 823 P.2d 499, 504 (1992); see supra text accompanying
note 15.
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offers made by the company. Finally, an insurance company must
refrain from engaging in any action which would demonstrate a
greater concern for the insurer’s monetary interest than for the
insured’s financial risk.36

The Tank court recognized this enhanced duty as particular to
insurance claims.37 The court reasoned that the fiduciary relationship was
important because of the contractual relationship between the insurer
and the insured, the “high stakes involved for both parties,” and
the “elevated level of trust” that undergirds the “insureds ‘dependence on
their insurers.’”38
A year after Tank, the Washington State Court of Appeals addressed
bad faith insurance claims in Escalante v. Sentry Insurance. The court in
Escalante addressed the appellant’s contention that an exception to
attorney–client privilege exists in bad faith litigation, looking to how other
jurisdictions utilize an exception.39 The court drew from cases such as
United Services Automobile Association v. Werley, in which the Supreme
Court of Alaska applied an exception to attorney–client privilege where
“privilege cannot be used to protect a client in the perpetration of a crime
or other evil enterprise.”40 This is generally referred to as the “fraud” or
“civil fraud” exception.41 In Werley, the insured brought a bad faith claim
against its insurer alleging the insurer wrongly refused to compensate him,
and without cause to do so, for a loss covered under his insurance policy.42
The court reasoned that once the insured presents a prima facie showing
of fraud within the attorney–client relationship, “the other party may not
then claim the privilege as a bar to discovery of relevant communications
and documents.”43
Escalante also relied on Caldwell v. District Court in and for City
and County of Denver, in which the Supreme Court of Colorado similarly
declared that an exception to attorney–client privilege applies to civil
fraud.44 The Caldwell court applied this exception to requests for
36. Tank, 715 P.2d at 1137 (emphasis added).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1136.
39. See Escalante v. Sentry Ins., 743 P.2d 832, 842–43 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987), overruled on
other grounds by Ellwein v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., 15 P.3d 640 (Wash. 2001).
40. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28, 31 (Alaska 1974).
41. See id.; Escalante v. Sentry Ins., 743 P.2d 832, 842–43 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).
42. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28, 33 (Alaska 1974).
43. Id. at 32–33.
44. See Caldwell v. Dist. Ct. In & For City & Cnty. of Denver, 644 P.2d 26 (1982). The court
also included a discussion that attorney–client privilege may be overcome by a showing of a
foundation in fact for civil fraud; accomplished after an in camera inspection of the documents at
issue. Cf. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28b (Alaska 1974) (declaring only a prima
facie showing is required to overcome the privilege).

1308

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 43:1299

production of communications and assessments between the defendants
(including the insurer) and their attorneys.45
Almost a decade after Escalante, a Washington court again
addressed bad faith insurance claims, adopting another jurisdiction’s
reasoning regarding privileges in insurance actions. The court in Barry v.
USAA examined two cases from Montana, holding that typically within
the insured–insurer relationship, the attorney is brought in and “paid by
the carrier to defend the insured and therefore operates on behalf of two
clients.”46 The court further stated that “it is a well-established principle in
bad faith actions brought by an insured against an insurer under the terms
of an insurance contract that communications between the insurer and the
attorney are not privileged with respect to the insured.”47 The court tied
this rationale into the overall theme of good faith and fair dealing with
respect to the processing of an insured’s claim. An alleged act of fraud or
bad faith undermines the good faith duty and should entitle an insured to
all communications made in those actions. In drawing from other states,
Washington began to develop its foundation for privileges, or the lack
thereof, in bad faith insurance claims, seeming to point in the direction of
no privilege.
II. THE CEDELL PRESUMPTION
After looking to other jurisdictions to build a framework for privilege
issues within bad faith insurance claims, Washington laid out its own
privilege exception in a landmark case. In Cedell v. Farmers Insurance
Company of Washington, the Washington Supreme Court again addressed
the issue of bad faith insurance claims and exceptions to an attorney–client
privilege. Cedell (the insured) alleged that Farmers (its insurer) acted in
bad faith when it failed to provide coverage for a “likely” accidental house
fire.48 After Farmers’ adjuster and estimator assessed the damage to be
over $50,000, Farmers hired an attorney to assist in making the coverage
determination.49 The attorney sent a letter to Cedell stating that Farmers
might deny coverage, and offered a one-time $30,000 offer—which
expired in ten days.50 After Cedell brought an action for bad faith (amongst
45. See Caldwell v. Dist. Ct. In & For City & Cnty. of Denver, 644 P.2d 26 (1982).
46. Barry v. USAA, 989 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Baker v. CNA Ins. Co.,
123 F.R.D. 322 (D. Mont. 1988); Silva v. Fire Ins. Exch., 112 F.R.D 699 (D. Mont. 1986)).
47. Id. at 1176–75; see also Silva v. Fire Ins. Exch., 112 F.R.D 699 (D. Mont. 1986) (explaining
work product and attorney–client privilege cannot be invoked to the insurance company’s benefit
where the only issue is whether the company breached its duty of good faith with respect to the
insurer’s claim).
48. Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 295 P.3d 239, 242–43 (Wash. 2013).
49. Id. at 242.
50. Id.
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other things), Farmers produced in discovery a “heavily redacted claims
file, asserting that the redacted information was not relevant or was
privileged.”51 Cedell moved to compel the production of the redacted
documents citing previous Washington cases holding that privilege in bad
faith litigation is limited and “does not apply to the insurer’s benefit.”52 In
response, Farmers sought a protective order to prevent the discovery,
claiming that the sought-after documents were privileged communications
between the attorney and the client (Farmers).53
The trial court judge—after conducting an in camera review of the
documents and legal conclusions regarding the cause of the fire—ordered
Farmers to provide all redacted documents to Cedell, reasoning that firstparty bad faith claims include a heightened duty to the insured and that the
insured is entitled to discovery of the claim files without the opposing
party’s claims for attorney–client privilege.54 The Court of Appeals
conducted an interlocutory review and reversed, holding that the lower
court “impliedly found that a showing that the insurer used the attorney to
further a bad faith denial of the claim was not sufficient grounds to pierce
the attorney–client privilege.”55
After accepting review, the Washington Supreme Court addressed
the issue of discovery in bad faith insurance claims. In its initial reasoning,
the court noted the importance of access to an insured’s claim file to seek
the very evidence that would support a claim for bad faith.56 Going further,
the court explained that
[i]mplicit in an insurance company’s handling of a claim is litigation
or the threat of litigation that involves the advice of counsel. To
permit a blanket privilege in insurance bad faith claims because of
the participation of lawyers hired or employed by insurers would
unreasonably obstruct discovery of meritorious claims and conceal
unwarranted practices.57

The court balanced the needs of Farmers and Cedell by recognizing
the broad purposes of discovery in order for parties to gain access to all
the necessary and relevant information to narrow the issues, and the

51. Id.
52. Id. at 242–43; see Soter v. Cowles Publ’g Co., 130 P.3d 840 (2006), aff’d, 174 P.3d 60 (2007)
(discussing discoverable work product exceptions including bad faith claims).
53. Cedell, 295 P.3d at 243.
54. Id. The judge also relied on Barry v. USAA, 989 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999),
regarding in camera review of bad faith insurance claim documents at issue. Id.
55. Cedell, 295 P.3d at 243.
56. Id. at 245.
57. Id.
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purposes of attorney–client privilege to disclose all relevant facts to an
attorney without fear of disclosure.58
In order to protect and balance these principles, the court ultimately
adopted the reasoning from Barry and announced that Washington
“start[s] from the presumption that there is no attorney–client privilege
relevant between the insured and the insurer in the claims adjusting
process and that the attorney–client and work product privileges are
generally not relevant.”59 The court then outlined that an insurer may
overcome this presumption of discoverability with a “showing that its
attorney was not engaged in the quasi-fiduciary tasks of investigating and
evaluating or processing the claim” but instead was engaged in providing
legal counsel for the insurer’s own liability. 60 Thus, if an attorney is
actually acting in a legal capacity for the insurer and not the insured, that
is, acting in a non-investigative role, the presumption may be overcome.
The Cedell court based this conclusion on the quasi-fiduciary
relationship between the insurer and first-party claimants.61 If an insurer
claims attorney–client privilege in order to withhold portions of an
insured’s claim file, the insurer bears the burden of proof of
“demonstrating factually” the role of counsel with regard to liability not
investigation.62 This presumption sets forth an overall rule regarding the
applicability and use of attorney–client privilege in Washington state. This
new standard, although derived from previous caselaw, required that all
insurance bad faith claims receive the same analysis to determine whether
such privilege will apply.
A. Post-Cedell Application
In the years following Cedell, Washington courts have applied the
presumption in bad faith insurance actions, both expanding and clarifying
it. This section will discuss the different ways in which Washington courts
have (1) expanded the presumption to third parties taking over insureds’
claims and (2) clarified the limitations on expansion to different parties’
statuses. In addition, this section will address the statutory support
surrounding Cedell as well as the policy rationale for it.

58. Id.
59. Id. at 246; see Barry v. USAA, 989 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that
typically in the insurer–insured relationship the attorney is engaged and paid by the carrier to defend
the insured and thus operates on behalf of both of them).
60. Cedell, 295 P.3d at 246.
61. Id. at 245; Birk, supra note 16, at 517. The Cedell presumption specifically focuses on firstparty claimants due to the different duties regarding a third-party or uninsured motorist claimant. See
discussion supra Part A and supra note 29.
62. Birk, supra note 16, at 517 (citing Cedell, 295 P.3d at 246).
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1. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Justus
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Justus, the claimant, Robert
Justus, was on William and Donna Morgan’s property in a pickup truck
with the Morgans’ allegedly stolen pipes in the back. As Justus drove
away, Morgan fired nine shots at the pickup, causing the truck to hit a
tree.63 Two years later,64 Justus sued the Morgans; in the suit, State Farm—
the Morgans’ insurer—agreed to defend the Morgans.65 Eventually, Justus
and the Morgans entered into a settlement that included “an assignment by
the Morgans of all their claims against State Farm to Justus.” 66
Subsequently, Justus sued State Farm on behalf of the Morgans, claiming
that State Farm had acted in bad faith and violated IFCA through the
assignment of extra-contractual claims.67 While litigating the extracontractual claims, Justus moved to compel State Farm to produce the
claim file for the incident. In response, State Farm asserted the attorney–
client privilege protection because the claim file was under the Morgans,’
as the insureds, privilege.68
The Justus court recognized the importance of the insured’s need for
access to a claim file to discover the necessary facts to support a bad faith
claim as found in Cedell.69 However, Justus can be distinguished from
Cedell in that State Farm was asserting the Morgans’ privilege of the claim
file, not its own attorney–client privilege.70 The court ultimately extended
the Cedell presumption “to requests for production of a claim file by a
third party who has been assigned a first party insured’s claims” and
remanded the case to the trial court for an in camera review to determine
if the claim file contained any material protected solely under the
Morgans’ very specific attorney–client privilege.71
The Justus court’s ruling extends the first-party claimant’s
importance in regard to attorney–client privileges—or the lack thereof—
in bad faith insurance claims to third party assignees. It further signifies
63. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Justus, 398 P.3d 1258, 1261–62 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
64. Id. The two-year time period is significant because Justus sued the Morgans two years after
the incident, which was after the expiration of the “intentional injury” statute of limitations. Id. at
1260. Justus thus alleged a claim of negligent wrongful detention. Id. at 1262.
65. Id. at 1262. State Farm agreed to defend the Morgans but reserved its rights to challenge
insurance coverage for any judgments entered against the Morgans.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1262–63.
69. Id. at 1268; Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 295 P.3d 239 (Wash. 2013).
70. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Justus, 398 P.3d 1258, 1269 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017). An in
camera review was required in order for the trial judge to determine if there was any privileged
information relating to the Morgans specifically, not to their overall claim file with State Farm
regarding the incident and determinations therein.
71. Id. at 1269–70.
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Washington courts’ views on the significance of disclosure of claim files
in bad faith insurance claims. This extension of the Cedell presumption
takes the presumption a step further into the realm of limiting attorney–
client privileges. Cedell ultimately adds additional avenues around any
attorney–client privilege between insureds and insurers by allowing
assigned third parties access to a first-party’s claim file. By extending the
presumption in this way, it expands the overall importance of broad
discovery rules in order to sufficiently gain all the necessary facts for a
claim and emphasizes that importance by allowing otherwise outside
parties access if assigned the insured’s rights. Although always dependent
upon the type of relationship and communications made—the quasifiduciary relationship of insured and insurer and whether any
communications made within the claim file were made due to an adverse
position based upon potential litigation—the presumption seems to open
more doors into the claim file than close them.
2. Leahy v. State Farm Auto Insurance
In a more recent case involving attorney–client privilege limitations
in insurance bad faith actions, Washington seems to take a step back and
set a boundary on how far its presumption extends. In Leahy v. State Farm
Auto Insurance, Shannon Leahy’s car was struck, and she suffered injuries
to her back and neck—an accident in which she was ultimately fault-free.72
Leahy had both personal injury protection (PIP) and UIM insurance with
State Farm.73 State Farm subsequently denied coverage for some of her
injuries, then later offered waivers of certain small amounts of its PIP
subrogation rights.74 After a jury trial over whether her insurance should
have covered the injuries she suffered—in which the jury ruled in favor of
Leahy—Leahy amended her complaint to include extracontractual claims
against State Farm, alleging bad faith insurance practices and violations of
both the IFCA and Consumer Protection Act (CPA).75 Leahy served State
Farm with a discovery request for the entire unredacted claim file.76 In
response, State Farm provided the claim file with significant portions
redacted.77 The trial court concluded that certain portions of the UIM claim
file were protected by attorney–client privilege.78

72. Leahy v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 418 P.3d 175, 178–79 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018).
73. Id. at 179.
74. Id. at 179–80.
75. Id. at 180. For relevant statutes outlining the Consumer Protection Act, see WASH. REV.
CODE § 19.86, Unfair Business Practices–Consumer Protection (2018).
76. Leahy, 418 P.3d at 181.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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The Court of Appeals, in determining whether the communications
were privileged, compared the facts of the case to Cedell. In doing so, it
noted the important distinction that Leahy involved a UIM claim, not a
first-party claim.79 In a UIM case, “the insured must overcome a higher
bar before it can discover privileged information.”80 The court explained
that one way to overcome the heightened bar is by a showing that a fraud
was planned at the time the privileged communication was made and that
the communication was made in furtherance of the fraudulent activity.81
The Leahy court seems to slightly close the wide-open door from the
Cedell presumption by keeping the difference in party position an
important aspect of the analysis. Although the Washington Court of
Appeals in Justus allows an assigned third-party access to a claim file, the
court in Leahy keeps the barriers to access up on UIM claimants. However,
the court does recognize an avenue around the attorney–client privilege if
the UIM claimant can satisfy a heightened bar.82 This suggests that even
though a UIM claimant is considered differently, the court still recognizes
the importance of broad discovery and limiting a blanket privilege. In
some respects, it is arguable whether this heightened privilege is fair, as it
would be more difficult to show planning of a fraudulent denial of
coverage or fraudulent activity without having access to the claim file.
Thus, if a UIM claimant could already show fraud to begin with, it would
defeat the purpose of gaining access to the claim file. However, this
position is understandable due to the status of the UIM claimant as
essentially stepping into the shoes of the tortfeasor and the insurer’s
necessity of counsel’s advice in strategizing defenses for such a claim.83
79. Id. at 181–82; Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 295 P.3d 239, 239 (Wash. 2013). For a
discussion on UIM party status, see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
80. Leahy, 418 P.3d at 181 (quoting Cedell, 295 P.3d at 239).
81. Leahy, 418 P.3d at 182 (quoting Barry v. USAA, 989 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Wash. Ct. App.
1999)). The court then asserts the two-step process for establishing fraud in Escalante: First, a
determination of “factual showing adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person that
wrong conduct . . . sufficient to evoke the fraud exception occurred”; and second, an in camera review
of the documents shows sufficient foundation in fact of change. Cedell, 295 P.3d at 245; see Escalante
v. Sentry Ins., 743 P.2d 832 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987) (articulating the two-step process).
82. Leahy, 418 P.3d at 181–82.
83. See supra note 29 and accompanying discussion on UIM claimants. In a more recent case,
Hoff v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill., 449 P.3d 667 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019), review denied, 458 P.3d 790
(Wash. 2020), the plaintiff made a UIM claim against Safeco, the insurer. Hoff, the insured, tried to
rely on Leahy to argue that the court had discretion to subject privileged materials to in camera review
in order to determine whether a factual foundation for civil fraud exists. Hoff, 449 P.3d at 675.
However, the court noted that Hoff was attempting to seek information regarding litigation strategies
of Safeco (i.e., decisions in removing the case to federal court); Hoff was not seeking information
regarding valuations like in Leahy. Id. The court once again emphasized the restrictions on the
presumption in UIM cases. Specifically, in UIM claims a presumption of attorney–client waiver does
not exist; instead, the classic work-product privileges apply. Since a UIM insurer “steps into the shoes”
of the at-fault insurer and defends as the prior insurer would, the privilege may only be pierced through
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B. Cedell and Statutory Authority
The laws in Washington surrounding attorney–client privilege are
codified in both the state’s rules of evidence and the Revised Code of
Washington (RCW). However, although the presumption adopted in
Cedell is now established in Washington’s common law, is not yet
codified. Washington’s rules of evidence first recognize attorney–client
privilege,84 then further identify specific instances of waivers or
limitations.85 These two rules are fairly common as they are modeled
almost identically after the Federal Rules of Evidence.86 Although
these rules are important in the discussion surrounding attorney–client
privilege in bad faith claims, the interesting part of the discussion arises
from the Washington statute codifying who is disqualified from
privileged communications or, more accurately, the statute’s lack of
specificity therein.
Washington, unlike some other jurisdictions,87 has somewhat broad
exceptions in its privilege statute.88 The statute details that an attorney or
counselor cannot, without consent of the client, be examined as to any
communication made by the client or to any legal advice discussed in the
course of legal employment.89 The relevant code does not lay out explicit
exceptions to the attorney–client privilege other than those modeled after
the federal rules in Rule 502.90
the crime-fraud exception by a “factual showing adequate to support a good faith belief by a reasonable
person that wrongful conduct sufficient to invoke the fraud exception has occurred.” Id. at 674–75
(quoting Cedell, 295 P.3d at 245).
84. WASH. R. EVID. 501.
85. WASH. R. EVID. 502.
86. Compare id., with FED. R. EVID. 501–02.
87. Hawaii’s rules of evidence include a list of specific exceptions from attorney–client
privilege, such as no privilege for joint clients, preventing crime or fraud, furtherance
of crime or fraud, and breach of duty by lawyer or client. HAW. R. EVID. § 626-1, r. 503(d)(1)–(7).
Idaho’s rules of evidence also lay out explicit exceptions to attorney–client privilege. IDAHO R. EVID.
502(d)(1)–(6).
88. Cf. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(2) (2016) (discussing the types of relationships, including
privileged communication but without explicit exceptions thereto).
89. Id.
90. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(2) (2016) and WASH. R. EVID. 502, with FED. R.
EVID. 502. Although this Comment does not discuss the implications of the work product doctrine, it
is interesting to note that WASH. CT. C.R. 26(b)(4) states that documents prepared in anticipation of
litigation are discoverable only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has a substantial need,
however, documents produced in the ordinary course of business are not immune. See Escalante v.
Sentry Ins., 743 P.2d 832, 842–43 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987). Work product rules, when dealing with
insurance claims of this nature, are significant because a possible explanation behind the insured’s
position in obtaining the insured’s claim file is substantial need since he or she would not otherwise
be able to obtain the necessary information needed to prove elements of a bad faith action by any other
means. Further, since normally the claim file is produced in the ordinary course of business when the
insurer is investigating the claim, it can be viewed as not immune to the work product doctrine under
such rules.

2020]

The Cedell Presumption

1315

Considering Washington’s reliance on common-law privilege
interpretations and not on uniquely codified rules, the court in Cedell
adopted the presumption “that there is no attorney[–]client privilege
relevant between the insured and the insurer in the claims adjusting
process, and that the attorney[–]client and work product privileges are
generally not relevant.”91 Ian Birk, in his article discussing the Cedell
presumption, explained that the presumption is consistent with the general
laws of attorney–client privilege, finding that in Cedell, the attorney’s role
was not solely limited to providing legal counsel.92 After all, the business
of an insurance company, once a potential claim exists, is to determine the
applicability of their contract to the fact pattern involved—in essence, to
make legal determinations of whether the claim is covered under the
contract and how much is properly owed.
In Washington, an insurer’s duties are codified under R.C.W. Title
48, highlighting a strong acknowledgement of public interest:
The business of insurance is one affected by the public interest,
requiring that all persons be actuated by good faith, abstain from
deception, and practice honesty and equity in all insurance matters.
Upon the insurer, the insured, their providers, and their
representatives rests the duty of preserving inviolate the integrity of
insurance.93

The above statute, coupled with Washington’s privilege statute and
the Cedell presumption, make Washington’s interpretation of attorney–
client privilege in bad faith insurance claims a logical and easily
discernable method to understand the complex issues arising from the
claim file documents and discovery in bad faith insurance claims. The
Washington State Supreme Court recognizes that denying an insured
access to their respective claim file would prevent the insured from gaining
the necessary evidence for a bad faith claim. Thus, if the insured is unable
to acquire such evidence, it would prevent the insurer from being held
accountable for its bad faith actions.94
III. EXTRA JURISDICTIONAL INSURANCE CLAIM PRIVILEGES
Since many insurance companies operate across multiple states, it is
important to discuss how other jurisdictions apply similar or contrasting
opinions to Cedell. The sections below detail how different states deal with
91. Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 295 P.3d 239, 246 (Wash. 2013) (citing Barry v. USAA,
989 P.2d 1172, 1175–76 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)); see also Birk, supra note 16.
92. Birk, supra note 16.
93. WASH. REV. CODE § 48.01.030 (1995).
94. See Cedell, 295 P.3d 239; 35 DAVID K. DEWOLF & MATTHEW ALBRECHT, WASH.
PRACTICE, WASHINGTON INSURANCE LAW AND LITIGATION § 26:19 (2019–2020 ed.).
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attorney–client privilege in bad faith insurance claims. As
discussed previously, all jurisdictions nationwide have some form of
codified attorney–client privilege; however, as examined through the
cases below, some of those statutes and their explicit requirements can
distinctly affect how the courts look at attorney–client privilege in bad
faith insurance actions.
A. Paralleling and Adopting the Cedell Presumption
1. Idaho
The first instance of a presumption similar to Cedell in Idaho
occurred in Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Credit Suisse. Credit Suisse, the
insured, requested documents related to Stewart Title’s investigation of
lien claims and decisions relating to coverage, defense, and settlement of
the claims.95 The court stated that the documents requested fell into two
categories: (1) “internal documents,” which included Stewart Title’s
evaluation of the lien claims; and (2) “outside documents,” which included
documents prepared by the various attorneys working for Stewart Title. 96
The trial court looked to Washington’s Cedell presumption, noting “that
the insured is entitled ‘to broad discovery, including, presumptively, the
entire claims file.’”97 The court also looked to Idaho’s privilege rules on
“joint client” exceptions and determined that they aligned with the opinion
adopted in Cedell.98 Idaho Rule of Evidence 502(d) states
there is no privilege under this rule . . . [a]s to a communication
relevant to a matter of common interest between or among two or
more clients if the communication was made by any of them to a
lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered in an action
between or among any of the clients.99

Drawing from a leading treatise, the court used its reasoning in interpreting
the joint-client exception as designed to apply to first-party bad faith
actions between an insurer and insured.100 In conclusion, the court found
95. Steward Title Guar. Co. v. Credit Suisse, No. 1:11-CV-227-BLW, 2013 WL 1385264, at *3
(D. Idaho Apr. 3, 2013).
96. Id.
97. Id. (quoting Cedell, 295 P.3d at 247).
98. Id. at *5; see also IDAHO R. EVID. 502(d)(5); cf. Evanston Ins. Co. v. OEA, Inc., 566 F.3d
915, 921 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that where a state’s supreme court has not addressed an issue, the
court must determine what result the state would reach based on other court opinions, statutes, and
treatises).
99. IDAHO R. EVID. 502(d).
100. Id. at 502(d)(5); 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5505 (1986) (discussing a proposed—although never adopted—FED. R.
EVID. 503(d)(5)). The treatise accredits the joint-client exception as the most common use of the joint-
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that Idaho’s codified exception aligned with Cedell, and found that the
insured was entitled to the entire claim file, without limitation by the
attorney–client privilege.101 The trial court in Idaho derived its version and
rationale of the Cedell presumption from an explicit codified exception to
attorney–client privilege. This justification is interesting due to the
differences from Washington’s codified privilege statutes that do not
explicitly lay out such exceptions. The Idaho court seemed to agree with
the basic premise of broad discovery rules but backed it up by interpreting
the joint-client exception to support this presumption. In some ways, it is
arguable that, by the court both drawing from Cedell and using its own
codified privilege laws, it was seeking to create an important rule with
which it would be difficult to disagree.
An Idaho trial court again applied the Cedell presumption
approximately six months later in Hilborn v. Metropolitan.102 In that case,
the trial court judge also agreed with Washington’s explanation of the
presumption. The court relied on the reasoning in both Cedell and Stewart
Title, looking to whether the attorney in question was working in an
investigative capacity or providing legal advice on coverage.103 The court
ultimately presumed that Metropolitan (the insurer), must turn over the
entire claim file, unless it could show that any documents within the file
related to the attorney providing legal counsel to its potential liability.104
The trial court seemed to be reasserting the importance of discovering a
claim file within an insurance bad faith claim, only implementing the
privilege when there is sufficient evidence that the attorney was only
providing legal counsel relating to liability, not simply coverage.
The Supreme Court of Idaho in Cedillo v. Farmers Insurance
declined to rule on a discovery issue in a bad faith insurance claim.
However, Chief Justice Burdick addressed the topic in his dissent, stating
that when the insurer’s attorney—who was not specifically hired to
provide advice to the insurer—investigates a disputed claim, the “attorney
is viewed as simultaneously representing the insured while investigating
client privilege in common law. It further details the “common interest” between the insurer and the
insured in communications made regarding the defense of the insured. However, that common interest
only extends so far. Once the communications extend beyond the claim file and onto divergent
interests, such as claims of bad faith or coverage disputes, those specific types of communications are
no longer within the exception. This reasoning adheres to the Cedell presumption because it allows
for an insured to have access to the claim file and any communications made during the claim process,
only limiting that once adverse action is taken.
101. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Credit Suisse, No. 1:11-CV-227-BLW, 2013 WL 1385264, at *5
(D. Idaho Apr. 3, 2013).
102. Hilborn v. Metro. Grp. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2:12-CV-00636-BLW, 2013 WL
6055215, at *3 (D. Idaho Nov. 15, 2013).
103. Id.
104. Id.
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the claim.”105 Further, this situation cues the presumption of
discoverability which entitles the insured to the full claim file.106 Chief
Justice Burdick ultimately declared his strong disagreement by stating
“[the insurer] nevertheless gets judgement in its favor despite its incredible
discovery abuses.”107
As discussed briefly in Stewart Title, Idaho’s codified privilege laws
lay out specific exceptions to attorney–client privilege, unlike
Washington’s seemingly broader privilege laws.108 Idaho’s privilege rules
include an explicit exception for “joint clients.”109 Under this exception,
communication relates to joint clients when there is a “common interest
between or among two or more clients if the communication was made by
any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered in
an action between or among any of the clients.”110
The courts in Stewart Title and Hilborn interpreted the insurerinsured relationship as that of joint clients when the insurer’s attorney was
engaged in the quasi-fiduciary tasks of investigating and evaluating the
claim, not providing legal counsel.111 Although the Idaho courts agree and
apply Cedell’s reasoning, I find it more impactful that the courts located
the presumption as part of its codified laws of exceptions to privilege. I
would argue that, by linking the presumption to a specific codified
exception, the Idaho courts signal the importance of blocking a blanket
privilege over claim files involved in bad faith insurance claims.

105. Cedillo v. Farmers Ins. Co, 408 P.3d 886, 896 (Idaho 2017) (Burdick, C.J., dissenting).
106. Id. (quoting Hilborn v. Metro. Grp. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2:12-cv-00636-BLW, 2013
WL 6055215, at *3–4 (D. Idaho Nov. 15, 2013)).
107. Id. at 899. In this case, the insurer, Farmers, conceded that its attorney was not hired to
provide coverage advice, but was only involved in routine claim handling and investigative work.
Thus, Farmers’ attorney was not acting in a privileged, legal capacity and should not have been able
to assert attorney–client privilege. This dissent furthers the view that even though the court declined
to rule on this issue in the majority opinion, there is strong backing for a presumption of no attorney–
client privilege due to the importance of the dual-fiduciary and joint representation that occurs in a
claim coupled with a bad faith allegation, raising serious needs for discoverability that the insurer must
meet the burden in overcoming. See id. at 893–99.
108. See supra Part II.B. for a discussion on the differences in statutes regarding Washington’s
seemingly broader privilege laws compared to those of states like Idaho and Hawaii, which lists
explicit exceptions.
109. IDAHO R. EVID. 502(d)(5).
110. Id.
111. See Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Credit Suisse, No. 1:11-CV-227-BLW, 2013 WL 1385264,
at *5 (D. Idaho Apr. 3, 2013); Hilborn v. Metro. Grp. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2:12-cv-00636-BLW,
2013 WL 6055215 (D. Idaho Nov. 15, 2013); see also WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 100
(explaining one of the most common uses the joint client exception is in suits between the insurer and
insured).
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2. Alaska
Alaska addressed a bad faith exception to attorney–client privilege
in Central Construction Co. v. Home Indemnity Co.,112 where a
construction company asserted its insurer was acting in bad faith by
denying coverage to two deceased workers. The court held that “services
sought by a client from an attorney in aid of any crime or a bad faith breach
of a duty are not protected by the attorney–client privilege.”113 This case
signified Alaska’s agreement to the fraud exception to bad faith insurance
claims and hinted that the state would follow, if it were not already
implicitly following, the Cedell presumption.
More recently, a trial court in Alaska in fact did restrict the attorney–
client privilege in bad faith claims by drawing from Cedell. In Heynen v.
Allstate Insurance Co., the court noted authorities from other jurisdictions
like Washington, finding that “protected material in insurance claims files
is discoverable,” and held that the insured’s communications protected by
attorney–client privilege could be discoverable to the extent they “fall
under the crime-fraud exception.”114
Alaska also has express exceptions to attorney client privileges.115
However, Alaska differs from Idaho by not using a “joint-client”
exception; instead, Alaska uses the “furtherance of crime or fraud”
exception to bypass attorney–client privilege in bad faith insurance
claims.116 Again, absent an established common law presumption, the use
of an explicit codified exception enhances the significance of the
restriction on attorney–client privilege for bad faith insurance claims.
Alaska, while using a different codified exception than Idaho, still
achieves the same goal of limiting the blanket-privilege insurance that
companies try to assert.
3. Illinois
Illinois has a “common interest” exception to attorney–client
privilege. “If the insurer and insured shared a common interest in the
underlying litigation, then the insured is entitled to an in camera inspection
of the claim file in the declaratory judgement action.”117 The exception is
112. Central Constr. Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 794 P.2d 595, 598 (Alaska 1990).
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. Heynen v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 1:11-cv-00010-TMB, 2013 WL 12171613 (D. Alaska Dec.
10, 2013); see also Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 295 P.3d 239 (Wash. 2013).
115. See ALASKA R. EVID. 503(d)(1), (5).
116. Id.; see also IDAHO R. EVID. 502(d)(5).
117. Dan D. Kohane, Sean Griffin & John R. Ewell, Invading the Sanctuary Practical Solutions
to Fend off the Attack on Confidentiality on Insurer Coverage Counsel Communications, 11 No. 2 INHOUSE DEF. Q. 42 (2016). See Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Int’l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d 322 (Ill.
1991); see also ILL. R. EVID. 502.
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similar to Idaho’s joint client exception and the proposed Federal Rule of
Evidence 503(d).118
In Waste Management, Inc. v. International Surplus Lines Insurance
Co., an Illinois court reasoned that in that state, there is a strong policy of
encouraging disclosure and ascertaining the “truth which is essential to the
proper disposition of a lawsuit.”119 The court also relied on the common
interest doctrine by looking at both the insurer’s and the insured’s interests
in settling or litigating the claims; further that the attorney in some
capacity has provided joint or simultaneous representation.120 This
common interest analysis mirrors the joint client exception because each
party retains similar underlying interests in respect to coverage and settling
the claims. This allows an insured access to the claim file because the
attorney, under a common interest in the claim, represents the insured and
the insurer as to coverage. Allowing an in camera review limits the
presumption of no attorney–client privilege—as seen under the Cedell
presumption—but still signifies the importance of the discovery by
allowing insureds an avenue to defeat the blanket shield.
4. Ohio
Ohio, early on, established the importance of discovery of an
insured’s claim file in bad faith litigation. Similar to Cedell—although
decided significantly prior—the Ohio Supreme Court held that “in an
action alleging bad faith denial of insurance coverage, the insured is
entitled to discover claims file materials containing attorney–client
communications related to the issue of coverage that were created prior to
the denial of coverage.”121 The court went so far as to note that “claims
file materials that show an insurer’s lack of good faith in denying coverage
are unworthy of protection.”122 Ohio’s holding and rationale seems to align
118. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note100.
119. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Int’l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d 322, 190 (Ill. 1991). The
court also discussed the argument regarding a “cooperation clause” within the insurance policy in
which the primary purpose is to protect the insurer’s interests and prevent collusion. Id. The court
explained that the cooperation clause imposed a broad duty of cooperation without limitation or
qualification and would require disclosure of “communication[s] [insured] had with defense counsel
representing them on a claim for which insurers had the ultimate duty to satisfy.” Id. at 192.
120. Id. at 194.
121. Boone v. Vanliner Ins. Co., 744 N.E.2d 154, 158 (Ohio 2001).
122. Id. (emphasis added). Note that Ohio’s statutory provisions regarding attorney–client
privilege also do not explicitly lay out an exception for bad faith claims brought by an insured. See
OHIO R. EVID. 501. However, Ohio does contain a rather specific statute concerning testimony of
attorneys pertaining to privileged communications. See OHIO REV. CODE § 2317.02(A)(2) (2016). The
testimonial privilege established under this division does not apply concerning either of the following:
(2) An attorney, concerning a communication made to the attorney by a client in that
relationship or the attorney’s advice to a client, except that if the client is an insurance
company, the attorney may be compelled to testify, subject to an in camera inspection by

2020]

The Cedell Presumption

1321

with the court in Cedell, highlighting the importance of the “discovery of
meritorious claims” and not “conceal[ing] unwarranted practices.”123
Although the supreme court applied this broad discovery, the court
reasoned that this is because the claims files generally do not contain work
product (things prepared in anticipation for litigation).124 So even though
the insured is entitled to the insurer’s claim file, it is not entitled to
communications relating to the bad faith litigation itself. Thus, when
insurers make the decision to deny coverage, no work product for litigation
has yet commenced.125 The court again confirms the importance of broad
discovery relating to the insured’s decisions in initially denying a claim,
as that is the very crux of any bad faith action.
5. Florida
Interestingly, on the outset it seemed as if Florida courts fully
rejected the presumption of no attorney–client privilege in insurance bad
faith claims, however, in a closer analysis, it seems Florida actually falls
on the side of a presumption.126 Florida caselaw distinguishes between
what is discoverable in first-party bad faith claims regarding work product
and attorney–client communications. In Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Ruiz, the
insured brought a bad faith action against its insurer, Allstate, after she
was involved in an accident in a vehicle that Allstate accidently deleted
from her policy.127 Within the bad faith action, the insured requested that
the trial court compel production of documents, including Allstate’s claim
and investigative file regarding the insurer’s claim.128 Allstate
subsequently claimed work product and attorney–client privilege, and
attempted to argue that “because the problem and dispute associated with
coverage was immediately apparent when it refused to make proper
payment . . . litigation was anticipated at all pertinent times associated with
a court, about communications made by the client to the attorney or by the attorney to the
client that are related to the attorney’s aiding or furthering an ongoing or future commission
of bad faith by the client, if the party seeking disclosure of the communications has made
a prima-facie showing of bad faith, fraud, or criminal misconduct by the client.
Id.
123. Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 295 P.3d 239, 245 (Wash. 2013).
124. Boone, 744 N.E.2d at 158.
125. This point was more recently examined and affirmed in Goodrich Corp. v. Com. Union Ins.
Co., 2008-Ohio-3200, ¶ 139 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). The court noted that although Boone allowed for
the discovery of claims files by the insured, it does not extend to work product or materials outside of
those files. Id.
126. Florida’s attorney–client privilege statute does not contain an express exception for bad
faith claims. See FLA. STAT. § 90.502 (2020).
127. Allstate Indem. Co. v. Ruiz, 899 So. 2d 1121, 1123 (Fla. 2005).
128. Id. A month after the commencement of the bad faith action, Allstate admitted its obligation
for coverage and its obligation to provide benefits to the insured. Id. The insured, however, continued
its bad faith claim in the denial of her claim. Id.
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each of the [insured’s] discovery requests . . . and, therefore, none of the
material was subject to disclosure.”129 Thus, this case focused on whether
the claim files—referred to as the work product—were discoverable.
Ultimately, the Florida Supreme Court held that
all materials, including documents, memoranda, and letters,
contained in the underlying claim and related litigation file material
that was created up to and including the date of resolution of the
underlying disputed matter and pertain in any way to coverage,
benefits, liability, or damages, should also be produced in a first-party
bad faith action.130

The court highlighted, just as did Cedell and other cases discussed
above, that the underlying claim materials are the exact evidence needed
to show that an insurer engaged in bad faith; thus, those documents are
treated differently in insurer bad faith claims and discoverable, as those
materials are vital to advance such an action.131
Where Florida seems to differ from other states can be seen in
Genovese v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co., a later case which
specifically addresses attorney–client communication privilege and
whether privileged material is discoverable in bad faith claims. In
Genovese, an insured sought discovery of the insurer’s claim file and all
correspondence between the attorneys for the insurer and the insurer’s
agents.132 The insurer argued that the decision in Ruiz did not extend to
discovery of documents protected by attorney–client privilege.133 The
Supreme Court of Florida responded by distinguishing between the
attorney–client privilege and work product, explaining that the work
product, or claim file, was discoverable under Ruiz as those materials are
required for a showing of bad faith; however, the attorney–client privilege,
unlike the work product doctrine, “is not concerned with the litigation
needs of the opposing party.”134 Therefore, work product in first-party
claims is also discoverable under Ruiz; the court noted, however, that the
exception does not apply to attorney–client communications.135
Importantly, though, this holding involves a specific situation in which
such communications are discoverable “where an insurer has hired an
attorney to both investigate the underlying claim and render legal

129. Id.
130. Id. at 1129–30.
131. Id. at 1128–29.
132. Genovese v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 74 So. 3d 1064, 1068 (Fla. 2011), as
revised on denial of reh’g, (Nov. 10, 2011).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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advice.”136 So, this opinion does in fact parallel Washington’s presumption
as it relates to the quasi-fiduciary relationship an attorney may play in the
claim determination. If an attorney acts in an investigative capacity in
regard to the claim determination, those communications would not be
considered privileged communications.137
6. Montana
Although Montana seemingly addressed the importance of
discovering an insured’s claim file when faced with the insurer asserting
attorney–client privilege, in more recent years Montana seems to have
narrowed its application. In Bergeson v. National Surety Corp., the court
stated that the “pivotal inquiry is the manner in which the insurance
company processed the claim.”138 Going further, the court explains that
[g]iven the need for complete discovery to be afforded to all parties
to the action, the interest of justice would best be served by
bifurcating the bad faith claims from the remainder of the case and
determining the liability issue first. Following resolution of the
underlying policy claim, plaintiff shall have access to the entire
claims file for inspection and copying, and the case shall proceed on
the issue of National’s bad faith.139

Montana, similar to Washington, does not have an explicit exception
to attorney–client privileges as Idaho or Alaska do; however, it is
similar and even referenced by Cedell as being vested in common law
that there is a presumption the insured is entitled to the entire claim file of
the insurer.140
After Bergeson, however, Montana seemed to tailor back its analysis
of attorney–client privilege in bad faith claims. In 1993, Montana’s
Supreme Court found that the attorney–client privilege applied to a
specific type of first-party bad faith action.141 In this case, the court noted
that the insurer and the insured were on adverse sides on the outset of the
underlying case because the insurer “stepped into the shoes of the
unidentified third party motorist when it denied [the insured’s] coverage

136. Id.
137. The Florida Supreme Court notes that in these types of situations, the trial court should
conduct an in camera review to determine whether the materials sought are protected in the true sense
of attorney–client privilege, or whether they constitute investigative communications in preparation
of materials that would be discoverable under Ruiz. Id. at 1068.
138. Bergeson v. Nat’l Surety Corp., 112 F.R.D. 692, 697 (D. Mont. 1986).
139. Id.
140. See id.; MONT. R. EVID. 502; see also Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 295 P.3d 239,
247 (Wash. 2013).
141. Palmer by Diacon v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 861 P.2d 895 (1993).
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under [their] uninsured motorist policy.” 142 Thus, this case presented a
unique first-party-UIM type case where the insurer’s attorneys were not
acting in the dual representation or quasi-fiduciary relationship as
explained in Cedell.143 “The attorneys who represented [the insurer] in the
uninsured motorist case have not represented [the insured], therefore the
dual representation reasoning does not apply in this case.”144
Montana applies a similar presumption to that of Cedell—even
before it was explicitly set out in Cedell—without a specific codified
exception to attorney–client privilege, but it also expresses its limitations.
The necessity of complete discovery, however, seems to be the underlying
theme across all of the discussed cases. Given that a claim of fraud within
the insured’s claim file has been made, it repeatedly seems that courts are
affording the most weight to the fact that, if allowed to assert a blanket
privilege, the insured parties would be at a distinct disadvantage, since
only the insurer truly knows what it did and why it did it.
B. Distinguishing or Rejecting Cedell
Jurisdictional differences exist on how far asserting attorney–client
privilege in bad faith insurance claims will succeed. Some jurisdictions
have altogether rejected the Cedell presumption and some have refined or
modified the presumption in their own ways. Highlighting the differences
amongst jurisdictions plays a vital part in establishing why a uniform
standard is necessary, and why some citizens are vulnerable to a higher
privilege application in some states than in others.
1. Hawaii
Hawaii has directly rejected the Cedell presumption. In Anastasi v.
Fidelity National Title Insurance Co.,145 the court stated that an assertion
of a bad faith claim does not nullify an attorney–client privilege; the rule
adopted in Cedell is inconsistent with the privilege as codified in Hawaii.
As codified in Hawaii, nothing in the general terms states that there
is a waiver of attorney–client privilege with respect to a bad faith claim.
Additionally, bad faith is not one of the seven explicit exceptions to
attorney–client privilege laid out in the Hawaii Rules of Evidence § 6261, Rule 503.146 Although Hawaii does not explicitly codify an exception
142. Id. at 905–06.
143. Id. at 906. Palmer, however, seems to align with the UIM limitations set out by Cedell and
other Washington courts. Id.
144. Id.
145. Anastasi v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 341 P.3d 1200 (Haw. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d in part
vacated in part, 366 P.3d 160 (2016).
146. HAW. R. EVID. § 626-1, r. 503.
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for attorney–client privilege, it has an explicit exception for
“joint clients” which is similar to Idaho’s exception although applied a
critically different manner.
Although this type of exception to the attorney–client privilege has
been both examined in common law and used through codified exceptions,
the court in Anastasi directly stated that attorney–client privilege is
codified in much more detail than in Washington, and that “nothing within
the general terms of HRE Rule 503 suggest that the attorney–client
privilege is inapplicable when a bad faith claim is asserted.”147 Hawaii
differs from states which have adopted and parallel Cedell in that it looks
to the exact language of the codified rules and states simply that if there
was an exception it would have been codified explicitly.148
2. West Virginia
West Virginia differs in the application of an exception to the
attorney–client privilege in bad faith claims in that it discusses specific
types of documents within an insured’s claim file.149 In State ex rel.
Montpelier U.S. Insurance Co v. Bloom, the insurer challenged the
disclosure of coverage opinion letters.150 It was recognized “that an
insurance company’s retention of legal counsel to interpret the policy,
investigate the details surrounding the damage, and to determine whether
the insurance company is bound for all or some of the damage, is a classic
example of a client seeking legal advice from an attorney.” 151 The court
ultimately found that disclosure of opinion letters was prevented by
attorney–client privilege because the legal counsel for the insurer was
performing work of determining policy language, deciphering judicial
decisions relating to the matter, and reviewing other applicable laws that
would obligate the insurer to recognize the claims filed.152
The results of having stricter, more precise situations and documents
threaded out of this complicated privilege problem seem effective;
however, I do not agree with the decision here. There is a common theme
within this problem: the overall importance of discovery in bad faith
claims. Opinion letters regarding coverage are often sought out to analyze
the facts and interpret the insurance contract to ensure coverage decisions
147. Anastasi, 341 P.3d at 1216–17; see also HAW. R. EVID. § 626-1, r. 503.
148. Anastasi, 341 P.3d at 1216–17; HAW. R. EVID. § 626-1, r. 503.
149. Similar to Washington though, West Virginia’s views on attorney–client privilege in bad
faith claims are rooted in common law, as there are no explicit exceptions codified in its rules of
evidence—like those of Idaho and Hawaii. See W. VA. R. EVID. 502.
150. State ex. rel. Montepelier U.S. Ins. Co. v. Bloom, 757 S.E.2d 788, 794 (W. Va. 2014).
151. Id. at 795 (quoting Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc. v. Lake Cnty. Park & Rec. Bd., 717
N.E.2d 1232, 1236 (Ind. App. 1999)); see also Kohane, Griffin & Ewell, supra note 17, at 42.
152. Bloom, 757 S.E.2d at 798.
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are given the appropriate time and inquiry.153 In a hypothetical thought, it
would seem that if an attorney’s opinion letter either advised something
from which the insurance company directly deterred—such as bad faith or
fraud—or advised insufficient coverage, that very document would be the
crux of the claim. Although trying to decipher and weed out specific
situations would help to promote a more understandable standard, simply
writing off an opinion letter seems too extreme. Instead, I would
recommend treating opinion letters as not explicitly shielded under
attorney–client privilege of the insured, but instead, subject to an in
camera review when asserting a bad faith claim. This would better ensure
the insurance company did fulfill, or did not fulfill, its obligations to the
claim file and would allow for a neutral party to decide whether the
privilege is in fact being in its true sense or as an improper blanket cover.
CONCLUSION
The attorney–client privilege, in any respect or area of practice, is
always seen as one of the most essential and important facets of legal
representation. As seen in this Comment, many different areas exist where
upholding the privilege can become tricky and applied in diverse ways.
Insurance bad faith claims specifically create difficult scenarios in
deciding whether a privilege applies, as the legal representative is working
both for the insurer in investigating the claim and, in turn, for the insured
in a quasi-fiduciary relationship.154
Insurance companies range from purely domestic—covering only
insureds within a limited jurisdiction—to nationwide—covering insureds
across the county—to global—operating to cover insureds across the
world. The cross-jurisdictional functions of insurance companies make a
uniform law surrounding privileges in bad faith actions desirable. Larger
insurance corporations have the ability to, and do, provide coverage across
all fifty states.155 By creating different legal standards around attorney–
client privilege throughout the nation, it makes national insurance
operations both a blessing and a curse. On one end, the insurance providers
153. Michael S. Quinn & L. Kimberly Steele, Insurance Coverage Opinions, 36 S. TEX. L. REV.
479, 485 (1995).
154. Birk, supra note 33, at 513 (relying on Tank v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 715 P.2d 1133,
1136 (Wash. 1986)).
155. State Farm was ranked the No. 1 writer of property and casualty insurance by premiums
written, the No. 1 writer of homeowner’s insurance by direct premiums written, and the No. 1 writers
of private passenger auto insurance by direct premiums in 2017. See Facts + Statistics: Insurance
Company Rankings, INS. INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-insurancecompany-rankings [https://perma.cc/VC9P-PQEC]. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company are licensed to provide insurance in all fifty
states. See State Farm Terms of Use for statefarm.com, STATE FARM, https://www.state
farm.com/customer-care/disclosures/terms-of-use [https://perma.cc/YZ6Z-9BW7].
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need to apply different standards across different states and need to rely
on different privileges. However, on the other hand, the insurance
providers are provided greater latitude and privileges in some states over
others. It seems necessary to create a uniform standard to ensure that all
individuals, regardless of jurisdiction, are afforded the same rights and
opportunities for their claim files as, most of the time, these insurance
providers are the same repeat players (as seen in the cases presented
herein, the insurers are under all but a handful of names).
Washington’s Cedell presumption should become a model for a
uniform view on attorney–client privileges in insurance bad faith claims
as it embraces the importance of broad discovery and affords the often
less-experienced insured the ability to bring to light an insurer’s bad faith
denials. I recommend that one of the following three possible avenues be
implemented to formalize the presumption articulated in Cedell: (1) a
codified federal rule of evidence—either an additional provision or
advisory comment—documenting the presumption found in Cedell; (2) an
additional provision to the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act
(UCSPA) implementing the presumption for bad faith claims; or
(3) an ABA formal opinion or additional comment to the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
A. Proposed Codified Federal Rule of Evidence
First, a codified federal rule of evidence would likely have the
greatest impact; almost all of the states mentioned in this Comment, and
around the country, have their respective rules of evidence pertaining to
attorney–client privilege modeled after the Federal Rules of Evidence. A
leading treatise interpreted a proposed Federal Rule of Evidence—
although never adopted—that was identical to Idaho’s joint-client
exception.156 This treatise comments on the common interest relationship
between the insured and insurers with respect to legal counsel on the
insured’s claim file.157 Reviving and codifying the rejected Rule 503(d)(5)
would cement the presumptions that deal with the vexing problems that
come about when attorneys represent more than one client on a single
issue.158 The Cedell presumption of no attorney–client privilege with
respect to the claim file would go into effect as a joint client relationship
where the attorney investigating the claim is simultaneously representing
the insurer and insured in their quasi-fiduciary relationship.
For example, the proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503(d)(5) stated
an explicit exception to attorney–client privilege:
156. See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 100; IDAHO R. EVID. 502(d).
157. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 100.
158. Id.
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(5) Joint clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of
common interest between two or more clients if the communication
was made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in
common, when offered in an action between any of the clients. 159

This proposed rule encourages each state to adopt an explicit jointclient exception. The proposed rule adequately lays out the nature of a bad
faith insurance claim by highlighting that the insured and the insurer share
a joint-client relationship under the theory of the quasi-fiduciary
relationship. When a bad faith claim arises between the now joint clients,
it would enable the insured to access their claim file which includes the
communications, documents, and relevant facts created out of the common
interests between the two.
B. Proposed Provisions to UCSPA
Alternatively, an additional provision to the UCSPA would likely
encourage application of the presumption to a majority of insurance
companies and create an industry wide standard. Because the UCSPA is
adopted in some form and extent in almost every state, insurance
companies would be uniformly advised and aware of the presumption of
no attorney–client privilege with respect to the insured’s claim file and
courts would then be able to rely on the industry-wide standard.160 For
example, a potential provision to the UCSPA could state: An insurer that
engages in any unfair claims practices, as defined in Section 4,161 is denied
the protection of attorney–client privilege with respect to the particular
claim file of the insured who asserts such violation, unless the insurer can
prove certain communications made, and notes within the claim file were
made in obtaining legal advice in preparation for a potential defense, in
which case a court may determine the specific portions to be redacted
under a legitimate attorney–client privilege.
Further clarification may be needed, as has been done in some of the
cases cited above, as to the timing of the files; if the communications were
made in an investigative capacity prior to or at the final determination of
denial or other decision in bad faith, such communications are deemed as
part of the investigative capacity and thus, are discoverable.

159. 56 FED. R. EVID. 183, Proposed FED. R. EVID 503(d)(5) (not enacted).
160. UNITED POLICYHOLDERS, ADVOCACY & ACTION PROGRAM, 50 STATE SURVEY OF BAD
FAITH LAWS AND REMEDIES (Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.uphelp.org/sites/default/files/publications/
Final%20-%20Bad%20Faith%20Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PJ4-B89Y].
161. UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT § 4 (NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS 1997),
https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/inline-files/MDL-900.pdf [https://perma.cc/TSH6-JX99].
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C. Proposed Provision to Rules of Professional Conduct
Lastly, an additional provision to the Rules of Professional Conduct
(RPC) would gain recognition by courts but also would be open to
interpretation and application at the state level. By introducing this
presumption into RPC 1.6 (confidentiality), either by laying out a specific
provision for bad faith claims or by introducing the topic into a comment
to the RPC, it would allow courts to rely on a recommended standard and
allow courts to better uniformly apply the presumption—or encourage
those who do not already.162 In any event, perhaps a comment to the RPCs
would affect the vast application of privileges in insurance bad faith
actions. This proposed addition would impose a national recommendation
to a national area of business. Because all fifty states have a similar
confidentiality rules to those of the American Bar Associations,163
imposing a presumption in this manner would similarly have a national
effect, not only on the future case law but also on the attorneys placed in
this quasi-fiduciary relationship themselves.
Insurance companies are large corporations, often operating across
various jurisdictions and, unfortunately, are currently without a uniform
rule on privileges between themselves and their insureds. As discussed in
this Comment, insureds are at a severe disadvantage in cases of bad faith
claims due to the control of claim files by the insurance company, claim
files which are essential to presenting a claim of bad faith. Washington’s
presumption encourages insurance companies to implement practices that
protect both the insurer’s interest—having the legal counsel specifically
designate their duties between investigative and representative—and the
insured’s interest—allowing the insured access to the very evidence of bad
faith.164 The importance in incorporating this presumption across every
state is paramount. If the different applications across jurisdictions
continue, the legal industry will continue to be stuck without guidance in
an area of the utmost importance, an area in which individuals depend on
in times of need, but yet, are often left wrongfully denied coverage with
no way of discovering the very documents to make their case.

162. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018)
163. See supra notes 2–3.
164. See Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash., 295 P.3d 239 (Wash. 2013).

